What Article 7.1 Is
The law on the status of judges contains a little-known provision — Article 7.1 — that allows a judge who has officially retired (taken “honorary retirement”) to return to the bench and resume hearing cases.
The mechanism was conceived as an emergency tool: for situations of acute staff shortages in a specific district, or a catastrophic backlog of cases. In such situations, the court president can temporarily bring in a trusted veteran.
In practice, the emergency tool has become a personal privilege for insiders and a convenient crutch for the system.
Why They Don’t Take Everyone Back
If the issue were purely about staffing, anyone willing to return would be brought back. But an independent judge who strictly applies the law and retired honorably is, in the vast majority of cases, not brought back.
A “second life” at the same court is granted primarily for two reasons.
Reason 1. Complete Manageability
The retired judge has already received everything the state could offer: status, a large lump-sum payment upon retirement, and a lifetime pension. They no longer need to build a career, and a reprimand means nothing to them. If any public scandal arises, they can instantly “return to retirement.”
Reason 2. Willingness to Handle “Difficult” Cases
A young judge who just passed their qualification exams cares about their reputation and is afraid to rule “on a phone call from above.”
A “vetted reserve” is ready to perform any administrative task — from dragging out proceedings and blocking evidence to issuing rulings that strain any reasonable legal position.
Double Pay at the Budget’s Expense
The system’s central paradox is financial. When a judge is called back under Article 7.1, they receive both a full judicial salary and their lifetime retirement pension simultaneously.
Double the budget outlay for a single person’s work.
Meanwhile, qualified young lawyers in the region have passed all their qualification exams and are ready to work for a single standard salary. But the judicial establishment keeps retired insiders in their seats, blocking any personnel renewal.
The Consequences
Caste immunity: retirement becomes a “hideout” where a judge retreats from any accountability while retaining all privileges. Returned from retirement — keep working. Problems arise — go back into retirement.
Erosion of trust in courts: society sees that judicial office has become a mechanism for converting loyalty into money. Young lawyers spend years passing qualification exams but cannot access positions.
Blocking structural reform: when “vetted personnel” occupy positions in courts, systemic reform — moving toward genuine adversarial process, transparency, and judicial independence — becomes impossible from within.
What Reform Would Look Like
Clear steps are needed to restore the system’s health:
Prohibit double payments. If a judge returns to the bench under Article 7.1, their retirement pension is suspended for the duration of the return. No “double pay.”
Mandatory rotation. A judge should not sit in one region for 15–20 years, building relationships with local officials. Transfer to a different region every 5–7 years would break the closed-circle culture.
Transparency and public accountability. Decisions to bring judges back from retirement should be made publicly, with stated justification — not behind closed doors by the court president.
Until these arrangements remain in the shadows, the budget will continue to pay a “double rate” for someone else’s loyalty, while citizens spend years pursuing basic justice.
Read Also
- Why Judges Are Almost Never Criminally Prosecuted: Immunity and Its Limits
- The Court Database Disappeared and Came Back: What This Means for Parties to Proceedings
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